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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
James Zane Parmer appeals from his conviction for lewd conduct with a 
child. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedincls 
Parmer, a massage therapist, sexually abused a fourteen-year-old girl by 
touching her clitoris with a vibrating massager and putting his fingers in her 
vagina in the course of a therapeutic massage. (Tr., vol. II, p. 960, L. 15 - p. 
1000, L. 11.) A grand jury indicted Parmer for lewd conduct with a child. (R., vol. 
I, pp. 8-9.) 
The state provided notice of intent to admit evidence governed by I.R.E. 
404(b), and moved in limine for a ruling on its admissibility. (Notice of intent to 
use 404(b) Evidence (hereinafter "First Notice"); State's Motion in Limine; znd 
Motion in Limine; 2"' Notice of Intent to use 404(b) Evidence (hereinafter 
"Second Notice"); State's Brief in Support of 2"d Motion in ~imine.') The 
evidence related primarily to other women and girls whom Parmer sexually 
touched in the course of physical therapy or massage. (First Notice; Second 
Notice; Tr., vol. I, p. 6, L. 9 - p. 10, L. 8; p. 17, L. 3 - p. 22, L. 25; 08/02/06 Tr., p. 
13, L. 10 - p. 15, L. 7; p. 19, L. 16 - p. 23, L. 2.) Parmer argued, through 
' These motions, notices and brief were filed under seal and are. included in the 
record as exhibits filed under seal. The first motion in limine was filed before the 
first jury trial, and the second motion in limine was filed after the first jury trial but 
before the second jury trial. They are referred to here together for convenience 
only. 
counsel, that the events that the witnesses in question would testify to were 
either too factually dissimilar (generally arguing there was insufficient evidence of 
sexual intent in the other touchings or that the sexual contact was consensual 
among adults) or too remote in time to be properly admissible. (Tr., vol. I, p. 10, 
L. 11 -p. 16, L.25;08/02/06Tr.,p.I6,L. 11 -p. 19, L. 13; p.23, L.7-p.24,L. 
7.) Ruling on the motions in limine, the trial court excluded evidence of sexual 
conduct or contact outside the context of Parmer providing physical therapy or 
massage to the witnesses, but admitted evidence of sexual touching by Parmer 
while providing physical therapy or massage services to female patients. (Tr., 
vol. I, p. 23, L. 1 - p. 26, L. 13; 08/02/06 Tr., p. 24, L. 8 - p. 29, L. 5.) 
The case proceeded to trial. (R., vol. I, pp. 119-45.) The witnesses 
covered by the first in limine ruling testified. (Tr., vol. I, p. 233, L. 10 - p. 245, L. 
19;p.249,L.Il-p.255,L.21~p.261,L.13-p.273,L.25~p.279,L.14-p. 
293,L.2;p.301,L.16-p.315,L.10;p.329,L.21 -p.337, L. 16.) Thetrial 
ended in a mistrial when the jury could not reach a unanimous verdict. (R., vol. I, 
pp. 141-45.) 
The case proceeded to retrial. (R., vol. II, pp. 247-77.) The witnesses 
allowed to testify under the trial court's I.R.E. 404(b) rulings testified. (Tr., vol. 11, 
p. 1063, L.23-p. 1085, L. 1 6 ; ~ .  1129, L. 15-p. 1137, L.2;p. 1144, L.20-p. 
1163, L. 3; p. 1173, L. 8-p.  1206, L. 14; p. 1226, L. 17-p. 1238, L. 16; p. 1245, 
L. 13-p. 1259, L.2; p. 1266,L. 16-p. 1275,L. 15;p. 1285, L. 13-p. 1300,L. 
25.) This time the jury unanimously found Parmer guilty. (R., vol. 11, p. 271.) 
The district court sentenced Parmer to 20 years incarceration with seven 
years determinate. (R., vol. II, pp. 281-84.) Parmer filed a timely notice of 
appeal. (R., vol. 11, pp. 285-89.) 
ISSUES 
Parmer states the issues on appeal as: 
A. Did the district court commit reversible error by allowing 
eight prior bad act witnesses to testify in the state's case-in-chief? 
B. Was it reversible error to preclude the defense from eliciting 
testimony regarding Officer Gilbert's interview with Mr. Parmer? 
(Appellant's brief, p. 20 (emphasis and underlining omitted, capitalization 
altered).) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
I. The district court held that evidence that Parmer had sexually touched 
other women while performing physical therapy or massage, the same 
circumstances under which he touched the victim in this case, was admissible. 
Has Parmer failed to show that the district court erred in admitting this evidence? 
2. Has Parmer failed to show from the record that he preserved any issue 
related to I.R.E. 106? 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
Parmer Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Rulinq Admittina I.R.E. 
404(bl Evidence 
A. Introduction 
The district court, ruling in ljmjne, admitted evidence by several witnesses 
that they had been sexually touched by Parmer during the course of physical 
therapy massages; circumstances very similar to those presented in the victim's 
testimony. (Tr., vol. I, p. 23, L. 1 - p. 26, L. 13; 08/02/06 Tr., p. 24, L. 8 - p. 29, 
L. 5.) On appeal Parmer argues the trial court erred, claiming the evidence was 
inadmissible (Appellant's brief, pp. 30-37), and that the court erred by making its 
ruling on the basis of the state's offer of proof (Appellant's brief, pp. 20-30).~ 
Parmer's arguments, however, lack legal and logical merit, much less show an 
abuse of discretion. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Evidentiary rulings by the trial court are generally reviewed for an abuse of 
discretion. State v. Porter, 130 ldaho 772, 785, 948 P.2d 127, 140 (1997); State 
v. Lewis, 126 ldaho 77, 82, 878 P.2d 776, 781 (1994). Rulings under I.R.E. 
404(b) are reviewed under a bifurcated standard: whether the evidence is 
admissible for a purpose other than propensity is given free review while the 
Parrner also apparently argues that one of the witnesses should have been 
excluded for violation of an order excluding witnesses, but has failed to show that 
the witness actually violated any such order; that the defense moved for her 
exclusion on this basis; that the defense obtained any adverse ruling to challenge 
on appeal, or that there was any abuse of discretion in not excluding the witness 
for any alleged violation of any order. (Appellant's brief, pp. 37-40.) 
determination of whether the probative value of the evidence is substantially 
outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice is reviewed for an abuse of 
discretion. State v. Sheldon, 145 ldaho 225, 230, 178 P.3d 28, 33 (2008). 
C. The Evidence In Question Was Properlv Admitted BV The Court 
Rule 404(b) of the ldaho Rules of Evidence provides that evidence of 
other "crimes, wrongs, or acts" is generally inadmissible to prove the character of 
a person or that the person acted in conformity with that character. I.R.E. 404(b). 
Such evidence is admissible, however, to prove matters other than propensity. 
I.R.E. 404(b). The district court must therefore first determine whether the 
evidence is probative to matters other than propensity. Second, the district court 
must weigh the probative value as to matters other than propensity against the 
danger of unfair prejudice, i.e., the likelihood that the trier of fact would consider 
the evidence as going to character or propensity. State v. Cross, 132 ldaho 667, 
670,978 P.2d 227,230 (1999). Evidence is excludable under the second prong 
of this test only if the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs its 
probative value. State v. Sheahan, 139 ldaho 267, 275-76, 77 P.3d 956, 964-65 
(2003). 
The district court ruled that evidence showing that during the course of 
therapeutic massages Parmer touched several females in a sexual manner was 
admissible. (Tr., VOI. II, p. 1063, L. 23 - p. 1085, L. 16 (witness K.M., Parmer put 
fingers in her vagina then rubbed himself against her until he ejaculated); p. 
1129, L. 15 - p. 1137, L. 2 (witness C.P., Parmer touched her buttocks); p. 1444, 
L. 20 - p. 1163, L. 3 (witness G.C., Parmer touched her sides, trying to fondle 
her breasts); p. 1173, L. 8 - p. 1206, L. 14 (witness T.C., Parmer touched her 
chest and genital area, rubbed his crotch on her buttocks, performed oral sex on 
her); p. 1226, L. 17 - p. 1238, L. 16 (witness C. H., Parmer touched her breast 
with his mouth and inserted his finger in her vagina); p. 1245, L. 13 - p. 1259, L. 
2 (witness P.F., Parmer touched her chest and genital area, performed oral sex 
on her and put his fingers in her vagina); p. 1266, L. 16 - p. 1275, L. 15 (witness 
J.H., Parmer touched buttocks and between breasts); p. 1285, L. 13 - p. 1300, L. 
25 (witness 6.0.' Parmer repeatedly touched her vaginal area).) This evidence 
was relevant to prove common scheme or plan, motive, opportunity, sexual 
intent, and absence of mistake or accident. (Tr., vol. I, p. 23, Ls. 1-8; p. 24, L. 25 
- p. 25, L. 18; 08/02/06 Tr., p. 27, L. 11 - p. 28, L. 4.) The court concluded that 
any prejudicial potential of the evidence could be minimized with an instruction 
on the proper consideration of the evidence, and therefore was admissible. (Tr., 
vol. I, p. 25, L. 19-p. 26, L. 10; 08/02/06Tr., p.27, Ls. 11-20.) 
In addition to the relevance found by the district court, the evidence was 
also relevant as corroboration of the victim. State v. Moore, 120 Idaho 743, 745- 
46,819 P.2d 1143, 1145-46 (1991) (prior bad act evidence may be properly used 
to corroborate victim). A jury could conceivably find a child's testimony that she 
was brazenly sexually abused in a semi-public place to be unlikely absent 
corroboration. Evidence that Parmer had done very similar things under very 
similar circumstances made the victim's factual testimony more credible. 
Parmer argues that there were dissimilarities between the victim's 
testimony and the testimony of the 404(b) witnesses that make the latter 
irrelevant. Specifically, he asserts that three of the witnesses testified that at 
some point they engaged in consensual contact with Parmer, that several of the 
witnesses were older when they were touched, and that some of the 404(b) 
witnesses discussed touching of different body parts. (Appellant's brief, pp. 32- 
34.3) These arguments are without merit. 
First, even though there was some consensual contact by some of the 
witnesses, all of them stated that the sexual touching was initiated by Parmer 
during the course of a massage. Second, the age differences that existed with 
some of the witnesses did not make the evidence irrelevant. See State v. 
Cardell, 132 Idaho 217, 220, 970 P.2d 10, 13 (1998). Finally, even if some of the 
touching was different in its details (what part of the woman Parmer touched), the 
underlying relevance is that Parmer was touching his massage clients in sexual 
ways with sexual intent. at 219-20, 970 P.2d at 12-13. Parmer's arguments 
that the evidence was irrelevant for any purpose but to show propensity are 
without merit. 
Parmer next argues the court abused its discretion in weighing the 
potential prejudice against the probative value. (Appellant's brief, pp. 35-37.) 
His argument fails, however, because Parmer's intent was an important part of 
this case. Given the circumstances of this case, including that the victim is 
Parmer also argues that intent and absence of mistake or accident were not 
"disputed issues" until he took the stand and affirmatively denied sexual intent. 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 34-35.) This argument is baseless because the state had 
the burden of proving sexual intent (which would include disproving accident or 
mistake) as an element of the crime. I.C. § 18-1508 (sexual intent an element of 
lewd conduct with a child). 
young and that touching without sexual intent would be normal in a massage, it 
was very important for the state to disprove accidental touching; demonstrate 
touching with sexual intent; show that despite the semi-public nature of the place 
Parmer had opportunity; show a common scheme or plan; and corroborate the 
victim. The court's conclusion that, if the potential prejudice is minimized by a 
curative instruction, the potential prejudice does not substantially outweigh the 
probative value was well within its discretion. 
Parmer has failed to show error in the admission of evidence under I.R.E. 
404(b). The evidence was relevant to prove several things other than propensity 
and the district court properly exercised its discretion in weighing the potential 
prejudice against the probative value. 
D. Parmer's Claim That The District Court Erred By Acceptina An Offer Of 
Proof Is Not Preserved For Review 
Parmer argues that the district court erred by ruling in limine that the 
proffered evidence was admissible under I.R.E. 404(b) because the court did not 
have the actual evidence before it and based its ruling on the state's offer of 
proof. (Appellant's brief, pp. 20-29.) This argument fails for the following 
reasons: (1) It was not preserved by timely objection, I.R.E. 103(a)(l); State v. 
t-JcJe, 127 ldaho 140, 898 P.2d 71 (Ct. App. 1995); (2) it is unsupported by any 
actual legal authority, State v. Zichko, 129 ldaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 
(1996); State v. Li, 131 ldaho 126, 129, 952 P.2d 1262, 1265 (Ct. App. 1998); 
and (3) it is wrong as a matter of law, State v. Joslin, 145 ldaho 75, 82, 175 P.3d 
764, 771 (2007) ("The purpose of an offer of proof is to make a record either for 
appeal or to enable the court to rule on the admissibility of proffered evidence."). 
11. 
Parmer's Araument That His Interview With Detective Gilbert And The Confront 
Call With The Victim Were Functionallv Part Of The Same Written Or Recorded 
Statement Is Without Merit 
The district court precluded Parmer from introducing evidence of his own 
statements to Detective Gilbert during a police interview because such 
statements are hearsay and not subject to any exception. On appeal Parmer 
argues that his statements to Detective Gilbert and his statements to the victim 
(in the confrontation phone call) are essentially part of the same written or 
recorded statement, so that admission of the former was necessary to show the 
context of the latter. (Appellant's brief, pp. 43-47.) This argument fails for two 
reasons. 
First, this issue is not preserved for appellate review because Parmer 
never asserted in the district court that the state had to introduce the recording of 
the police interview when it introduced the recording of the confrontation call 
under I.R.E. 106. Instead, the record shows that Parmer tried to introduce 
evidence of the interview, but that the court excluded it on hearsay grounds. (Tr., 
vol. I, p. 386, L. 9 - p. 389, L. I; p. 450, L. 14 - p. 451, L. 9; 08/02/06 Tr., p. 38, 
Ls. 3-7.) A timely objection is necessary to preserve evidentiary issues for 
appeal. I.R.E. 103(a)(l); State v. Hyde, 127 Idaho 140, 898 P.2d 71 (Ct. App. 
1995). Here Parmer has utterly failed to show that he ever requested the trial 
court to consider whether evidence of his subsequent statements to Detective 
Gilbert were necessary to provide context to his prior statements in the 
confrontation call under I.R.E. 106. 
Second, the argument that the state is automatically required to admit a 
defendant's later explanation of a previously recorded statement by him is 
without merit. Although I.R.E. 106 does provide that if a party presents a 
recorded statement that another recorded statement may be admitted "which 
ought in fairness be considered contemporaneously with it," Parmer's 
subsequent attempt to explain away, during a police interview, his statements 
made in the confrontation call do not fall within the scope of this rule. If Parmer's 
argument were accepted, all recorded out of court statements explaining prior 
recorded out of court statements would be admissible. The statements to 
Detective Gilbert, in short, were not necessary to frame Parmer's statements to 
the victim in proper context in the interest of completeness. See Beech Aircraft 
Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 172 (1988) (Rule 106 applies when 
"misunderstanding or distortion can be averted only through" the presentation of 
additional evidence required for "completeness" (quotes omitted)). 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Parmer's conviction for 
lewd conduct with a child. 
DATED this 1st day of October 
Deputy Attorney ~enekal  U 
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